Estimating the employer size-wage premium in a panel data model with comparative advantage and non-random selection by Cerejeira, João
Estimating the employer size-wage premium in a
panel data model with comparative advantage and
non-random selection
João C. Cerejeira Silva∗†
European University Institute (Italy) and
NIPE - Universidade do Minho
Version 1.1 - May 2004
Abstract
This paper considers the estimation of the employer-size wage eﬀect
using a panel of employer-employee matched data. We test for the
possibility of diﬀerent returns to observable human capital variables
as well as examine the role played by unmeasured skills in driving
the allocation of workers across firms of diﬀerent sizes. Our results
show that some of the observed skills; namely, education, age, and
tenure have high returns in large firms, while the opposite is true for
high skilled occupations and for the gender gap. On the other hand,
the price of non-observed skills is reduced as firm size increases. This
finding is consistent with explanations based on the premise that large
employers have more diﬃculty monitoring workers, which therefore
leads them to monitor less closely.
JEL: D20, J21,J24, J31
Keywords: firm size, wages, non-random selection.
∗I would like to thank Andrea Ichino, Massimo Motta, Frank Vella and all the par-
ticipants at the Labor Working Lunches at EUI, for helpful comments. All errors are
naturally my own. Financial support from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, the
Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (grant POCTI/ECO/47624/2002), the
European University Institute and the Universidade do Minho is gratefully acknowledged.
†Corresponding address: Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, Cam-
pus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal. Tel: +351966873038. Fax: +351676375.
E-mail: jsilva@iue.it or jccsilva@eeg.uminho.pt.
1
1 Introduction
The fact that large employers pay higher wages than small employers has
long been recognized as an important component of the variation in work-
ers’ wages1. In the U.S. economy, this wage gap is approximately equal to
the gender wage gap and larger than the one associated with unionism or
race. However, previous attempts to account for this premium using ob-
servable worker or employer characteristics have had limited success, and
there remains a significant and unexplained premium paid to workers of
large employers2.
The literature to date, surveyed first by Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) and
more recently by Oi and Idson (1999), has mainly considered this wage gap
as a diﬀerence in wage levels, which means that the eﬀect of firm size on
workers’ earnings is independent of their skills. Diﬀerences in the prices of
workers’ skills have also been considered, but only in terms of measured skills
(e.g. Troske, 1999). However, unmeasured skills, such as “ability”, may play
an important role in sorting workers into firms of diﬀerent size, particularly
if individual ability is not equally valued in small and large firms.
Several explanations support the idea that the eﬀect of firm size on work-
ers’ earnings is independent of their skills. Some of these are related with
1This relation was first discovered by Henry L. Moore (1911).
2See, for the US case, the seminal work of Brown and Medoﬀ (1989). For Europe, see
the work of Winter-Ebmer; Zweimuller (1999) for Switzerland; or Albaek, Arai, Asplund,
Barth and Madsen (1998) for Nordic countries.
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the behavior of the entrepreneurs that control large organizations. Models
based on the eﬃciency wage theory3 and on the rent-sharing hypothesis4
can be included in this set of behavioral explanations. Also, if working con-
ditions in small firms are better than in large firms, lower job satisfaction
can be a reason for workers in large firms to ask for a wage premium in order
to comply with these working conditions5. The second set of explanations
for the size-wage premium, in levels, is related with the idea that wages and
overall productivity move together, namely if there are increasing returns to
establishment and firm size due to technical economies as well as agglomer-
ation eﬀects. These are related to the higher capital/labor ratios and to the
quality of the capital employed in larger plants that raise labor productivity
for all workers.
Diﬀerences in the prices of workers’ skills can also be justified in several
ways. Workers’ skills can be more productive in large firms than in small
firms due to the complementarity between physical capital and human cap-
ital. Then, large firms prefer a more skilled labor force, and they are more
able to pay higher prices for these skills. On the other hand, measured skills
(like education or experience) and unmeasured skills may be priced diﬀer-
ently by large and small firms due to diﬀerences in monitoring costs (Garen,
1985). If these monitoring costs are higher in large firms, then these type
3Bulow and Summers (1986) show that large employers will choose to pay higher wages
in order to reduce the amount of monitoring.
4See, for example Weiss (1966) or Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
5Brown and Medoﬀ (1990) found little evidence of this.
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of firms may prefer to reward better the skills that are directly observable
relative to small firms. Therefore, diﬀerent returns to both measured and
unmeasured components of human capital can be expected, but it is not
clear, a priori, what is the overall eﬀect on wage profiles.
Empirical methodology used in these studies consists in estimating a
mincerian wage equation, where variables on firm and/or establishment size
are included. However, measures of the skills available in standard data
sets are imperfect because some workers’ skills are observed by the market
but not by the econometrician. This problem has been partially reduced
in panel data models, in which unobserved skills are partially captured by
a time-invariant fixed eﬀect that is equally valued by firms, independent of
their size, but a more realistic model might have to assume that not only
do workers’ characteristics vary by firm size, but also the returns to these
characteristics. If worker’s skills are not identically productive across the
firms’ size spectrum, we can expect that workers sort themselves between
large and small firms according to their skills’ endowments and returns.
The selection bias generated by the non-random allocation of workers
with diﬀerent skills into employers of diﬀerent sizes has been adjusted by
the estimation of selectivity-corrected models that include a prediction of the
size category in which the worker will be employed (Idson and Feaster, 1990;
Lluis, 2003). The results show evidence of non-random selection of workers
into firms of diﬀerent sizes. This selection is found to be negative in large
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firms and positive in small firms, and they conclude that workers in large
firms are of lower quality in terms of unmeasured skills. However, as pointed
out by Oi and Idson (1999), this kind of correction implicitly assumes that
the “value” of the unobserved drive and motivation is the same across firm
sizes. Attributes such as individual initiative that are productive in small
firms may actually be a hindrance in large firms that organize production
around structured teams. Also, in this framework, the selection rule only
comes from one side of the market.
The major contribution of our paper is the extension of the available
empirical literature, not only methodologically, but also in terms of the
use of a very rich database. First, we estimate the size-wage gap using
an estimator that extends the standard panel data techniques to the case
in which the return to permanent component of the error term is diﬀer-
ently rewarded across firm sizes. This is a case of a more general model
with interactions between time-varying explanatory variables and some un-
observable, time-constant variables. It can be shown that a model of this
type can be estimated using a non-linear instrumental-variables technique.
This strategy has been used in other contexts in which first-diﬀerenced esti-
mates are inconsistent, specially in the case of the additive unobserved eﬀect
not having the same eﬀect in all time periods as in Holtz-Eakin, Newey and
Rosen (1988), or as in Lemieux (1998), who estimates a model in which the
return to time-invariant unobserved characteristic is diﬀerent in the union
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and the non-union sectors. More recently Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Par-
ent (2002) apply a similar methodology to study the wages and allocation
of workers across occupations and across industries.
Second, previous empirical work has relied on either worker surveys with
little information about the employer or establishment surveys with little in-
formation about the workers. In contrast, this study uses employer-employee
matched data, and therefore not only can some aspects of the labor demand
side be controlled, but we can also exploit the panel structure of the data to
account for the individual unobserved heterogeneity. Also we will focus our
econometric estimations on a sample of workers displaced by firms closings,
as in Gibbons and Katz (1992), which reduces the problems generated by
endogenous worker-firm mobility.
Our results are consistent with previous findings on the subject, although
we are using a diﬀerent sample in a diﬀerent national context. Some of the
observed skills, namely education, age and tenure have high returns in large
firms, while the opposite is true for high skilled occupations and for the
gender gap. On the other hand, the price of non-observed skills is reduced
as firm size increases. This finding is consistent with explanations based on
the premise that large employers have more diﬃculty monitoring workers,
and therefore leads them to monitor less closely.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of
wage determination and firm size-type choice, and the estimation strategy.
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The data from the 1994-1998 Portuguese "Quadros de Pessoal" dataset is
presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows the results of the estimations, and,
finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model and Econometric Framework
2.1 The Model
This section presents an estimable two-sector model of wage determination
and firm choice, in which technologies are diﬀerently sensitive to workers’
observed and unobserved skills. Therefore, workers are not identically pro-
ductive in large and small firms, and non-random assignment of workers into
firms of diﬀerent size arises.
The model consists in a set of identical firms that diﬀer only in their size
j, small (S) or large (L) (j²{S,L}), operating in a competitive environment
and producing output using labour as the only input. Worker i has eﬀective
ability θi, not observed by the econometrician, and other measured human
capital endowments X0it. The production technology is such that if worker
i is assigned to firm with size j, in time t (t = 1, 2, ..., T ), he produces yjit
yjit = exp(α
j
0 +X
0
itβj + cjθi + εit), j = S,L (1)
where εit captures all productivity shocks, uncorrelated withX0it and θi. Due
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to competition among firms, the wage is equal to the output. Therefore the
(log) wage is:
lnwjit = α
j
0 +X
0
itβj + cjθi + εit (2)
Note that X0it and θi can be priced diﬀerently across firms of diﬀerent
sizes, because βj ∈ {βS ,βL} and cj ∈ {cS , cL}. The diﬀerence αL0 −αS0 = α0,
is "pure" firm size-wage premium, independent of the worker’s characteris-
tics that measure "true size-wage eﬀects", such as rent-sharing or overall firm
productivity, and cj measures the sensitivity of the price of eﬀective ability
to the firm size. The constants αj , βj , and cj are known to all labor-market
participants.
Assume that:
αL0 = αS0 + α0, (3)
cS = 1 (4)
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and
cL = (1 + ψ). (5)
Hence, the wage of a worker in a large firm is given by:
lnwLit = αS0 + α0 +X0itβL + (1 + ψ)θi + εit, (6)
and the correspondent wage in a small firm is:
lnwSit = αS0 +X0itβS + θi + εit. (7)
It is easy to see that, for each worker, the expected wage diﬀerence
between large firms and small firms is:
E(Dit) = α0 +X0it(βL − βS) + ψθi. (8)
In this framework, the wage diﬀerence between large and small firms has
three diﬀerent sources: the first is the ”pure” firm size-wage premium which
leads to diﬀerent intercepts in the earnings equation. The second source of
the gap is related to diﬀerences in measured skills’ prices, and finally, the
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remaining part of the gap is due to diﬀerences in returns to unobservable
skills.
Workers are utility maximizers and the utility associated with working
in a large or small firm is a function of firm attributes that are size specific,
such as wage or working conditions. Also, we will consider a parameter to
capture the disutility related with inter-firm mobility, not related with the
wage. Workers prefer to work in large firms as long as the utility acquired
in this type of firm is greater than the utility of working in a small firm,
excluding the mobility (utility) costs.
Let V jit denote the indirect utility of working in a firm of size j, at time
t, which is given by:
lnV jit = δ
j
0t − δi1,(t,t−1) + δ2 lnw
j
it, j = S,L, (9)
where δj0t is a parameter that measures the eﬀect of working conditions on
the worker’s utility, and δi1,(t,t−1) is a measure of the mobility (utility) costs6.
This parameter is set to zero if the worker stays in the same firm in both
periods t−1 and t, and has some positive value if the worker leaves one firm
at t− 1 to join another at t.
A worker prefers to work at a large firm if his utility V Lit is greater than
6This parameter will be important to rationalize worker’s mobility, uncorrelated with
his wage setting.
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the utility of working in small firm V Sit . Representing the (expected) net
gain of choosing a large firm by the latent variable U∗it = E(V
L
it − V Sit ), the
assignment rule of a worker into a large or small firm corresponds to the
following conditions:
the worker i chooses L :→ U∗it > 0→ (δL0t − δS0t)− δi1,(t,t−1) + δ2E(Dit) > 0
(10)
and
the worker i chooses S :→ U∗it < 0→ (δL0t − δS0t)− δi1,(t,t−1) + δ2E(Dit) < 0.
(11)
Finally, the allocation rule is: a worker with endowment (X0it, θi) and
mobility costs δi1,(t,t−1) chooses a large firm if and only if:
U∗it > 0→
1
δ2
[(δL0t − δS0t)− δi1,(t,t−1)] + [α0 +X0it(βL − βS)] > −ψθi. (12)
This assignment rule states workers’ preferences according to their skills
endowments and returns, working conditions and inter-firm mobility costs.
Individuals’ movements between large and small firms can be rationalized
by changes in X0it, δ
j
0t or δ
i
1,(t,t−1). However, X
0
it, is composed by some time
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invariant characteristics, such as gender or education, and therefore changes
in X0it are only due to job tenure or labor market experience. Also, large
changes in the diﬀerence (δL0t − δS0t) cannot be expected. Nevertheless, con-
sidering mobility costs may be a way to explain worker’s mobility. Suppose
that a certain number of workers lose their jobs because of (exogenous) firm
closures. All of these workers have to support some mobility costs δi1,(t,t−1),
in order to be hired by another firm. Therefore, for these workers, the utility
thresholds that assign them to a large or small firm will be less restrictive,
and we can expect more mobility from large to small firms and vice-versa.
2.2 Econometric Specification
An estimable wage equation is obtained by concentrating the small and the
large firm’s wages into the following equation:
lnwit = Lit(lnw
L
it) + (1− Lit)(lnwSit) + εit (13)
where Lit is a dummy variable that equals to one when the worker is in
a large firm and zero otherwise7. εit is an idiosyncratic error term that
captures all the determinants of the individual wage, not correlated with
worker’s skills and firm size. Plug-in the equations (6) and (7), we have:
7The variable Lit can also be continuous, as the log of firm’s employment. We keep
this variable as a dummy just for simplicity. In the empirical estimation we will use the
continuous measure of the firm size.
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lnwit = αS0 +X0itβS + θi + Lit
£
α0 +X0it(βL − βS) + ψθi
¤
+ εit = (14)
= αS0 + Litα0 +X0it
£
βS + Lit(βL − βS)
¤
+ [1 + Litψ] θi + εit.(15)
The last equation allows the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity θi
to interact with the firm size variable Lit. This is an example of a more
general model with interactions between time-varying explanatory variables
and some fixed unobservables. Models of this type were studied by Polachek
and Kim (1994), where the return to experience is allowed to be person
specific, and Lemieux (1998) who estimates a model in which the return
to the time-invariant unobserved characteristic is diﬀerent in the union and
the non-union sectors. More recently, Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent
(2002), analyze the theoretical and econometric implications of models of
this type to explain the wage diﬀerentials by industry and occupation8.
Estimating the previous equation with OLS would give inconsistent esti-
mates of the average wage gap α0, because the error component [1 + Litψ] θi
is correlated with Lit, if θi is a determinant of the worker’s firm choice. Also,
θi cannot be eliminated by first-diﬀerencing equation (15) because it is in-
teracted with the [1 + Litψ] term. Nevertheless, consistent estimates of the
firm size wage premium can be obtained by quasi-diﬀerencing the equation
8See also Wooldridge (2002), ch. 11, for a survey.
13
of interest and using appropriate instrumental-variable techniques, as we
will explained next.
2.3 Estimation Method
The first step is to solve equation (15) for θi :
θi =
lnwit − [αS0 + Litα0 +X0it
£
βS + Lit(βL − βS)
¤
+ εit]
[1 + Litψ]
. (16)
If we take the first lag of the above expression and substitute θi into (15),
the final equation is given by:
lnwit =
£
αS0 + Litα0 +X0it
¡
βS + Lit(βL − βS)
¢¤
+
[1 + Litψ]
[1 + Lit−1ψ]
× (17)
× £lnwit−1 − [αS0 + Lit−1α0 +X0it−1 ¡βS + Lit−1(βL − βS)¢]¤+ eit,
where
eit = εit −
[1 + Litψ]
[1 + Lit−1ψ]
εit−1. (18)
The term
£
lnwit−1 − [αS0 + Lit−1α0 +X0it−1
¡
βS + Lit−1(βL − βS)
¢
]
¤
is
the excess wage that indicates how much the observed wages departs from
the wage predicted on the basis of observed characteristics. Hence, the
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equation (17) indicates how the excess wage in period t is related to the
excess wage in period t− 1. This relationship is equal to 1 + ψ for workers
that move from a small firm to a large firm, and it is equal to one for stayers.
Equation (17) is non-linear and could be estimated by nonlinear least
squares. However, lnwit−1 is correlated with εit−1 and thus with eit by
construction. Therefore we have to use appropriate instruments that are
correlated with lnwit−1 but not with eit. The two period lagged information
on firm and job characteristics can be used as instruments for lnwit−1 as
long as some additional assumptions are made.
The most important assumption to estimate consistently (15) is the strict
exogeneity assumption:
E(εit|Li1, ...LiT ,Xi1, ...,XiT , θi) = 0, (19)
which says that, once observable characteristics Xit, firm size Lit and un-
observables θi have been controlled for, (Lis,Xis) for s 6= t, do not help
to explain the lnwit. The use of two period lagged firm and job character-
istics as instruments also implies the assumption that these variables only
aﬀect current (log) wage through variations in lnwit−1, which means that εit
should be uncorrelated with its past values. This can be expected because
we use a sample of displaced workers by firms closures: it is likely that firm
15
characteristics at t − 2 are correlated with worker’s wage at t − 1, but we
can easily assume that these instruments only (conditionally) aﬀect logwt
through logwt−1, because at t workers will be allocated to diﬀerent firms.
Assumption (19) rules out the possibility that temporary sector or indi-
vidual specific shocks can aﬀect the firm size choice. Also, changes in the
quality of job matches should not be correlated with changes in firm type
aﬃliation. Only permanent comparative advantage can be correlated with
the firm size choice, as predicted in the previous theoretical model.
However, we would not have this problem if we based our estimation on
a group of workers that were exogenously removed from their jobs and then
randomly assigned to new firms. Some workers were assigned to firms of the
same size as before, while others were assigned to firms of diﬀerent sizes.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on such experiments, but we can select
a group of workers that were displaced and who lost their jobs because
of firm closings. Note that this sample is only random if the probability
of being displaced by a firm closing is not correlated with the error term
εit. Therefore, some control for firm attributes are necessary, which will
be included in the vector Xit. In spite of this limitation, this sample is
particularly helpful, not only because we get more variation on the variables
of interest, namely the firm size indicator, but also because firm choice after
displacement is more likely to be (conditionally) exogenous. The use of this
particular sample, provides variation only through firm-movers, which rules
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out the endogeneity that arises from firm growth eﬀects on worker’s wages,
through promotions or on-the-job training.
The estimation procedure, will be based in a GMM estimator, which can
be estimated following the next steps. The assumption that the instruments
Zi are exogenous can be expressed as:
E(Z0iei) = 0. (20)
The P instruments give us a set of P moments, gi(bφ) = Z0ibei = Z0i(logwt −
f(bφ)), where f(bφ) is the lhs of equation 17, without the error term, and bφ
the vector of parameters α,β,ψ to be estimated.
The GMM estimator bφGMM for φ is the one that minimizes the GMM
objective function:
J(bφ) = g(bφ)0Wg(bφ), (21)
where g(bφ) = 1n nP
i=1
gi(bφ) = 1nZ0be.
The eﬃcient GMM estimator is the GMM estimator with an optimal
weighting matrix W , one which minimizes the asymptotic variance of the
estimator. This is achieved by choosing W = S−1, where S denotes the
covariance matrix of the moment conditions g :
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S =
1
n
E(Z 0ee0Z) =
1
n
E(Z 0ΩZ). (22)
To allow for heteroskedasticity, first the parameters contained in the
vector φ are estimated, using S = 1nE(Z
0Z), with Ω = I. These consistent
but ineﬃcient parameters are used to compute a heteroskedasticity-robust
variance matrix bS :
bS = 1
n
(Z 0bebe0Z) = 1
n
(Z 0bΩZ), (23)
and eﬃcient GMM estimates are obtained using W = bS−1. The overiden-
tification test is computed as n times the value of the minimized function
J(bφ), which follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the overidentifi-
catying restrictions (the diﬀerence between the number of instruments and
the number of parameters).
3 Data
3.1 Variables and Sample Selection
In this work we estimate regressions of logarithm of hourly wages on co-
variates representing gender, human capital (education, age, occupational
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status and tenure), firm attributes (size indicator, sales, average education,
ownership status and region) and industry indicators. The data employed
were obtained from an administrative source (“Quadros de Pessoal”, here-
after QP), which has been employed for statistical purposes by the Ministry
of Employment. This source covers all firms employing paid labor in Por-
tugal and records detailed information on all individuals on the payroll in
October (March, before 1993).The survey records information on salaries
as well as on worker’s attributes such as gender, education, age and tenure
for over 2 and a half million people every year. Moreover, it also records
information on the employer, from which we used firm size and sales, av-
erage education and ownership status (whether the firm is majority owned
by private domestic, foreign or state), industry and location. The existence
of a unique identification number (social security number) for the workers
and firms enables the construction of a panel of workers matched with firm’s
characteristics.
Sample selection From the original dataset, we selected the observations
on the following basis: first we dropped part-time workers as well as workers
that did not work the normal period in the month of the survey (about 22%
of whole dataset). Recall that the information on social security numbers is
not validated because is not used for the production of oﬃcial statistics and
consequently there are some coding errors and missing observations. There-
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fore, we dropped all observations without a valid identification number (3 to
7%, depending on the year) and dropped all individuals whose identification
number appears twice or more, after keeping the full-time workers. This is
probably due to a typo or a mistake when the data was introduced, but also
could be the case that some individuals have more than one full time job.
Note that if some workers have a full-time job and a part-time one, then the
information related with the latter job is deleted, while we maintained the
former.
Then, we excluded all the observations for which one of the variables
used in our analysis is missing, such as education level or date of birth and
then we retained only the workers in firms with more than five employees,
non-agriculture or fishery, and located in continental part of Portugal.
In order to reduce the endogeneity of movement decision we considered
a sample of displaced workers, who lost their jobs because of firms closings
in 1995, 1996 and 19979. Also, we only kept workers with full information
one year before displacement (moment t − 1), three years before (moment
t−2) and one year after displacement (moment t). So, our sample has three
sets of workers: displaced in 1995 and observed in 1992, 1994 and 1996;
displaced workers in 1996 and observed in 1993, 1995 and 1997; and, finally,
displaced workers in 1997 and observed in 1994, 1996 and 1998. The total
number of individuals in the full sample is 25151.
9We assumed that we observe a firm closing if the identification number of one firm
appeared in period t but did not appear in t+ 1, t+ 2 and/or t+ 3.
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The variables of Interest The Data Appendix A gives us detailed in-
formation about all the variables. The wage variable that we used was the
log of hourly earnings, where earnings were defined as the sum of all regular
wage components. Earnings and labor time were measured in the months
of March (1992) and October (from 1993 to 1998). This variable is not de-
flated by the consumer price index because, in the estimation, all variables
are centered around their means. This is required in order to estimate equa-
tion (17), because we cannot include a constant, due to multicollinearity of
the regressors. Therefore, we implicitly assume that E(θi) = 0.
The information about the education of the workers was given in lev-
els (primary school, low secondary school, high school and college), so we
converted it to the corresponding years of schooling to compute the aver-
age schooling at the firm level10. From the workers file we extracted the
variables gender, age, occupation (managers and executives, high skilled,
skilled and non-skilled) and tenure. From the firm files we used sector (we
set 6 diﬀerent sectors: manufacturing, construction, trade, transports and
communications, finance and other services), equity capital share of foreign
owners, sales and employment level as our firm size indicator. We also in-
clude a dummy for each region (we consider 5 diﬀerent regions: the North,
the Center, Lisbon, the South and the Algarve). All the variables were
computed using the same dataset.
10 In the computation of the firm’s average education we exclude the worker’s own edu-
cation, in order to avoid multicolinearity problems.
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In appendixes A1 and A2 we show some descriptive statistics of the sam-
ple, before displacement (at t−1) and after displacement (at t), respectively.
It is interesting to note that 10% of the workers were employed in large firms,
before displacement, and 20% after displacement. This means that mobility
takes place, mainly from small to large firms, after displacement. As we can
see in Appendix A1, large firms, with more than 499 employees, pay, on av-
erage, roughly more 0.50 log points than small firms. Large firms also have
a more skilled workforce (with 8.16 average years of education, comparing
to 6.75 in small firms, before displacement), but with similar ages. Workers
in small firms are mainly in manufacturing, while trade is the predominant
sector for workers in large firms.
4 Results
The GMM estimates (based on first moments) are reported in column 2 of
Table 1. We also present an estimation with the constraint ψ = 0 being
imposed, in column 1. In this case, the model is equivalent to the first-
diﬀerenced specification, commonly used in panel data studies.
[Table 1 here]
Concerning the first estimation, the elasticity of the firm size relative to
worker’s wage is positive and significant, and equal to 0.034. This means that
doubling the firm size implies an average wage increase of 2.2%. Relaxing
the ψ = 0 assumption, in column 2, the estimated wage gap, in terms of
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elasticity, is reduced to 0.020. These results are consistent with the ones
reported in the table by Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) (range 0.021-0.032), for
US longitudinal data.
The coeﬃcients of observed characteristics can only be identified if these
vary though time (as tenure) or interacted with the firm size indicator, if
the latter changes between the two periods. We report only the interactions
coeﬃcients. The other estimates are reported in Appendix B. We find a
mixed eﬀect of size of firms on the prices of these attributes. More educated
and older individuals benefit from moving to a large firm, and the price
of tenure also increases with firm size. However, the specific returns to
managers and high skilled workers are smaller when these workers move
from a small to large firm. Also, we report some evidence that the gender
wage ratio declines with firm size, which is consistent with the evidence
surveyed in Oi and Idson (1999).
Concerning the parameter ψ, the negative value found implies that the
price of unobservables decreases as firm size increases. This means that
small firms are more willing to pay a premium for worker’s ability, than large
firms. This an important result, but nevertheless is in the line of previous
attempts to control for self-selection and sorting of workers in firms across
size spectrum.
The overidentification test is a natural way to test whether the instru-
ments are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with the error term in
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equation (17). In a complicated non-linear model like ours, this test can fail
either because the model is mispecified or because the model is well-specified
but the instruments are invalid11. The statistics reported at the bottom of
Table 1 show that we marginally cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
overidentification restrictions are inconsistent with the data.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the available empirical literature on the firm size-wage
eﬀect in several ways. We estimate the size-wage gap considering an es-
timator that extends the standard panel data techniques to the case in
which the return to permanent component of the error term is diﬀerently re-
warded across firm sizes. Also this study uses a very rich employer-employee
matched data, and therefore not only can some aspects of the labor demand
side be controlled, but also the panel structure of the data to account for the
individual unobserved heterogeneity can be exploited. The use of a sample
of displaced workers by firms closings, reduces the problems generated by
endogenous worker-firm mobility.
Although we are using a diﬀerent sample in a diﬀerent national context,
our results are consistent with previous findings on the subject. Some of
the observed skills, namely education, age and tenure have higher returns
in large firms, while the opposite is true for high skilled occupations and for
11See Gibbons, et al. (2002), for a discussion about the test in this type of models.
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the gender gap.
Also, the price of non-observed skills is reduced as firm size increases.
This finding is consistent with explanations based on the premise that large
employers have more diﬃculty monitoring workers, and therefore leads them
to monitor less closely (see Stigler (1962) or Garen (1985)). As a result, they
are less able to detect the subtler aspects of worker quality (such as eﬀort)
and they pay more for workers of given quality. Small firms have greater
ability to monitor, and hence they can reward the best workers.
Finally, future research should include the comparison of this approach
with a model that accounts explicitly for the sample selection bias, as in
Vella and Verbeek (1998) or Vella (1998). Since we use a panel of workers
and firms, we can decompose the endogeneity underlying firm size choice
into an individual-specific component and an individual/time specific eﬀect.
25
References
[1] Albaek, K., M. Arai, R. Asplund, E. Barth and E. Madsen (1998),
“Employer size wage eﬀect in the Nordic Countries.”, Labour Economics
5 (4), 425-448.
[2] Akerlof, G. and J. Yellen (1990), “The fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis and
unemployment”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 255-284.
[3] Brown, C. and J. Medoﬀ (1989), “The employer size-wage eﬀect”, Jour-
nal of Political Economy 97, 1027-1059.
[4] Bulow, J. and L. Summers (1986), “A Theory of dual labor markets,
with applications to industrial policy, discrimination, and keynesian
unemployment”, Journal of Labor Economics 4, 376-414.
[5] Garen, J. (1985), “Worker heterogeneity, job screening and firm size”,
Journal of Political Economy 93, 715-739.
[6] Gibbons, R. and L. Katz (1992), “Does unmeasured ability explain
inter-industry wage diﬀerentials?”, Review of Economics Studies 59 (3),
515-535.
[7] Gibbons, R. L. Katz, T. Lemieux and D. Parent (2002), “Comparative
advantage, learning and sectoral wage determination”, NBER Working
Paper Series, WP 8889.
26
[8] Holtz-Eakin, D. W. Newey and H. Rosen (1988), “Estimating vector
autoregressions with panel data”, Econometrica 56, 1371-1396.
[9] Lemieux, T. (1998), “Estimating the eﬀects of unions on wage inequal-
ity in a panel data model with comparative advantage and nonrandom
selection”, Journal of Labor Economics 16, nba2, 261-291.
[10] Lluis, S. (2003), “Endogeneous choice of firms size and the structure of
wages: a comparison of Canada and the United States”, HRRI Working
Paper 02-03, Industrial Relations Center, University bof Minnesota.
[11] Moore, H. (1911), Laws of Wages, Macmillan, New York (reprinted
1967, Augustus M. Kelley, New York).
[12] Oi, W. and T. Idson (1999), “Firm size and wages”, in O. Ashenfelter
and D. Card, (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Chapter 23,
Elsevier Science B.V.
[13] Polachek, S. and M. Kim (1994), “Panel estimates of the gender earn-
ings gap”, Journal of Econometrics 61, 23-42.
[14] Stigler, G. (1962), “Information in the labor market”, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 70, 94-105.
[15] Vella, F. (1998), “Estimating models with sample selection bias: a sur-
vey”, The Journal of Human Resources 33, 127-169.
27
[16] Vella, F. and M. Verbeek (1998), “Whose wages do unions raise? A dy-
namc model of unionism and wage rate determination for young men”,
Journal of Applied Econometrics 13, 163-183.
[17] Weiss, L. (1966), “Concentration and labor earnings”, American Eco-
nomic Review 56, 96-117.
[18] Winter-Ebmer, R. and J. Zweimuller (1999), “Firm-size wage diﬀeren-
tials in Switzerland: evidence from job-changers”, American Economic
Review 89, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Eleventh An-
nual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1999), 89-
93.
[19] Wooldridge, J. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and
Panel Data, MIT Press.
28
Table 1: GMM Estimates of the Wage Equation
Dep.Var: First Diﬀ . Est. Quasi Diﬀ . Est.
Log of Hourly Wage (t) (1) (2)
Coeﬃcient (Std. Error) Coeﬃcient (Std. Error)
Log(size) 0.034*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.003)
Returns to unobs. skillsψ 0 -0.196*** (0.007)
Returns to observed skills
inter. with firm size
Male 0.004** (0.001) -0.023* (0.011)
Managers -0.007 (0.006) -0.165*** (0.024)
High Skilled -0.008* (0.003) -0.048*** (0.016)
Skilled -0.005** (0.003) -0.022 (0.015)
Tenure 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001* (0.000)
College 0.023 (0.005) 0.098*** (0.019)
High School 0.017*** (0.002) 0.100*** (0.011)
Low Sec. School 0.014*** (0.002) 0.048*** (0.007)
Age 0.002*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.001)
Age sq./1000 -0.026*** (0.002) -0.058*** (0.006)
Overidentification test 21.042
(p-value) (0.101)
No. of observations 25151 25151
E s t im a t e s w e r e m ad e b y fi t t in g th e q u a s i -d iﬀ e r e n c ed w a g e e q u a t io n ( 1 7 ) by
n o n - l in e a r in s t r um en t a l va r ia b l e m e th o d s .
O m it t e d d um m y va r ia b l e s : m a nu fa c t u r in g , p r im a ry s ch o o l , L is b o n a n d n o n - s k i l l e d .
T h e in s t r um en t a l va r ia b l e s u s e d a r e a l l t h e r e g r e s s o r s c i t e d in th e t e x t
(w o rke r a n d fi rm ch a r a c t e r i s t ic s ) p lu s tw o p e r io d la g g ed fi rm ch a ra c t e r i s t i c s ( r e g io n , fi rm s iz e ,
s e c t o r , ow n e r sh ip s t a tu s , av . e d u c a t io n , l o g s a le s a n d t e nu r e ) .
* * * S ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 1% , * * s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 5% , * s ig . l e v e l low e r t h a t 1 0% .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in i s t r y o f L a b o r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t .
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Appendix A1: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size, Before Displacement
Variable Total      Large      Small 
 (N=25151)      (>499)      (<500) 
 
Large Firm 9.6%   
Small Firm 90.4%   
 
Log(wage) 6.42 6.84 6.37
 (0.62) (0.55) (0.61)
Worker Characteristics 
Age 38.12 38.11 38.12
 (15.76) (14.34) (15.90)
Primary School 65.9% 43.4% 68.3%
Low Secondary School 15.5% 33.9% 13.6%
High School 14.1% 17.7% 13.8%
College 4.4% 5.0% 4.3%
Male 59.7% 55.8% 60.1%
Managers & Exec. 3.4% 3.6% 3.4%
High Skilled 16.4% 20.5% 16.0%
Skilled 67.1% 64.7% 67.3%
Non Skilled 13.1% 11.1% 13.3%
Job Tenure 10.86 11.93 10.76
 (6.26) (6.33) (5.35)
 
Firm Characteristics 
Foreign 9.7% 6.0% 10.0%
Public 0.6% 0.0% 0.7%
Log (Size) 4.09 7.13 3.77
 (1.57) (0.64) (1.26)
Log (Sales) 12.00 15.04 11.68
 (4.08) (3.65) (3.98)
North 34.8% 35.7% 34.7%
Center 24.3% 26.5% 24.1%
Lisbon 35.2% 34.1% 35.3%
South 2.0% 1.9% 2.0%
Alentejo 3.7% 1.8% 3.9%
Av. Firm Educ. 6.89 8.16 6.75
 (2.41) (1.45) (2.45)
Manufacturing 50.3% 17.9% 53.8%
Construction 6.9% 1.1% 7.5%
Trade 26.9% 43.1% 25.2%
Trans. & Commun. 2.7% 0.0% 3.0%
Finance 9.5% 31.9% 7.1%
Other Serv. 3.6% 6.0% 3.4%
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Appendix A2: Descriptive Statistics  by Firm Size,  After Displacement 
Variable Total      Large      Small 
 (N=25151)      (>499)        (<500) 
 
Large Firm 20.8%
Small Firm 79.3%
Log(wage) 6.58 7.03 6.47
 (0.65) (0.68) (0.58)
Worker Characteristics  
Age 40.12 41.40 39.35
 (15.68) (13.14) (15.06)
Primary School 64.4% 48.1% 68.7%
Low Secondary School 15.9% 26.5% 13.2%
High School 14.9% 19.8% 13.6%
College 4.8% 5.6% 4.6%
Male 59.7% 64.1% 58.5%
Managers & Exec 4.0% 5.5% 3.6%
High Skilled 17.4% 24.1% 15.6%
Skilled 67.0% 61.1% 68.5%
Non Skilled 11.6% 9.2% 12.2%
Job Tenure 1.08 1.16 0.95
 (0.78) (0.82) (0.72)
 
Firm Characteristics 
Foreign 12.4% 19.2% 10.6%
Public 0.4% 1.2% 0.2%
Log (Size) 4.49 7.25 3.76
 (1.92) (0.71) (1.41)
Log (Sales) 12.25 15.88 11.30
 (4.45) (2.82) (4.31)
North 35.1% 28.7% 36.8%
Center 24.4% 27.5% 23.6%
Lisbon 34.8% 35.9% 34.6%
South 2.0% 3.0% 1.7%
Alentejo 3.7% 4.9% 3.4%
Av. Firm Educ 7.25 8.28 6.98
 (2.48) (1.73) (2.57)
Manufacturing 46.6% 33.0% 50.1%
Construction 7.0% 2.1% 8.3%
Trade 27.6% 33.5% 26.0%
Trans. & Commun. 3.3% 1.0% 3.9%
Finance 11.4% 27.0% 7.3%
Other Serv. 3.6% 3.2% 3.7%
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Appendix B1 – First-Differences Estimates ( 0=ψ ): All Workers 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Log(Size) 0.034 0.002 15.794 0.000
Age 0.009 0.002 4.818 0.000
Age square/1000 -0.081 0.014 -5.638 0.000
Managers 0.172 0.024 7.147 0.000
High Skilled 0.116 0.012 9.875 0.000
Skilled 0.045 0.007 6.228 0.000
Tenure 0.002 0.000 6.194 0.000
Low Sec. School -0.007 0.011 -0.595 0.552
High School -0.003 0.014 -0.207 0.836
College 0.066 0.039 1.707 0.088
Foreign 0.124 0.088 14.038 0.000
Public 0.098 0.034 2.851 0.004
Av. Firm Education 0.018 0.002 8.500 0.000
Log (Sales) -0.004 0.001 -7.205 0.000
Construction 0.036 0.019 1.867 0.062
Trade 0.014 0.009 1.495 0.135
Transp. & Communic. 0.109 0.027 4.060 0.000
Finance -0.005 0.019 -0.288 0.774
Other Serv. 0.002 0.020 0.095 0.924
North 0.019 0.003 6.575 0.000
Center 0.012 0.003 4.138 0.000
South 0.005 0.008 0.610 0.542
Algarve 0.0004 0.008 0.047 0.963
 
Vars Interacted w/ 
Log(Size) 
Male  0.004 0.001 2.443 0.015
Managers -0.007 0.006 -1.149 0.251
High Skilled -0.008 0.003 -2.661 0.008
Skilled -0.005 0.003 -2.039 0.041
Tenure 0.001 0.000 10.431 0.000
Low Sec. School 0.014 0.002 7.179 0.000
High School 0.017 0.002 7.858 0.000
College 0.023 0.005 4.834 0.000
Age 0.002 0.000 10.365 0.000
Age square/1000 -0.026 0.002 -11.842 0.000
N=25151   
R-squared 0.679     F-statistic 1649.559
Adjusted R-squared 0.679     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
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Appendix B2: GMM Estimates: All Workers 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Log(Size) 0.020 0.003 6.757 0.000
Age 0.008 0.002 3.840 0.000
Age square/1000 -0.072 0.016 -4.420 0.000
Managers 0.102 0.031 3.253 0.001
High Skilled 0.115 0.014 8.347 0.000
Skilled 0.042 0.009 4.554 0.000
Tenure 0.002 0.000 4.504 0.000
Low Sec. School 0.012 0.013 0.945 0.345
High School 0.006 0.016 0.345 0.730
College 0.102 0.047 2.194 0.028
Foreign 0.095 0.010 8.793 0.000
Public 0.055 0.041 1.332 0.183
Av. Firm Education 0.004 0.003 1.444 0.149
Log (Sales) -0.002 0.001 -2.613 0.009
Construction 0.028 0.020 1.386 0.166
Trade 0.015 0.011 1.366 0.172
Transp. & Communic. 0.121 0.029 4.133 0.000
Finance -0.016 0.028 -0.588 0.557
Other Serv. -0.043 0.036 -1.193 0.233
North 0.005 0.003 1.487 0.137
Center 0.002 0.004 0.416 0.677
South -0.019 0.010 -1.977 0.048
Algarve 0.00002 0.009 0.003 0.998
 
Vars Interacted w/ 
Log(Size) 
Male  -0.023 0.012 -1.929 0.054
Managers -0.165 0.024 -6.824 0.000
High Skilled -0.048 0.016 -3.065 0.002
Skilled -0.022 0.015 -1.541 0.123
Tenure 0.001 0.000 1.801 0.072
Low Sec. School 0.048 0.007 6.665 0.000
High School 0.100 0.011 9.144 0.000
College 0.098 0.019 5.283 0.000
Age 0.008 0.001 10.626 0.000
Age square/1000 -0.058 0.006 -10.094 0.000
      
Ret. to Unobs. (ψ ) -0.196 0.007 -27.059 0.000
N=25151   
R-squared 0.539     J-statistic 0.008
Adjusted R-squared 0.538    
 
